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Abstract
This article gives an overview of the formation of the global nuclear industry,
highlighted a critical issue of ensuring safe operation of nuclear power systems in
modern projects. Considering the use of passive safety systems in the design of a
nuclear power plant, and discussed the different mathematical methods for assessing
the reliability of passive systems. Also it considers the possibility of finding the mean
time between failures, using these methods to assess the reliability of passive safety
systems.
Keywords: passive system, reliability, failure rate
1. Introduction
Advanced nuclear power plants in the world consisted of many safety systems and
equipment. These systems and equipment must be designed and installed at the sta-
tion, and tested to ensure their quality and reliability, to perform three main safety
functions: controlling the reactivity, cooling the reactor and containing the radiation.
2. Safety systems
Safety systems and safety equipment (component) are designed to prevent accidents
and mitigate the effects of accidents once happened, according to the IAEA safety
system defined as: A system important to safety, provided to ensure the safe shutdown
of the reactor or the residual heat removal from the core, or to limit the consequences of
anticipated operational occurrences and design basis accident [1].
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The system which affecting the reactivity the NPP, are divided into active and pas-
sive. Passive systems do not need external energy sources for their work. As a rule,
passive systems are less complex in their design compared to active safety systems,
while active systems need an external power source for the operation, which reduces
their reliability.
3. Passive safety systems
A safety system is basically composed of safety components, which are defined (by
the IAEA) passive if they do not need any external input to operate [2]. If a component
is not passive, it is necessarily an active one. This applies to whole safety systems as
well: A passive system consists of passive components only, otherwise it is defined
active. However, if a system uses active components in a very limited way, it can be
labeled passive.
Passive component [2] defined as, a componentwhose functioning does not depend
on an external input such as actuation, mechanical movement or supply of power, a
passive component has no moving parts, and, for example, only experiences a change
in pressure, in temperature or in fluid flow in performing its functions. In addition,
certain components that function with very high reliability based on irreversible action
or change may be assigned to this category.
These two types passive and active are distinguished from each other by determin-
ing whether there exists any reliance on external mechanical or electrical power, sig-
nals or forces. Passive safety systems are independent from such external factors and
are instead reliant on natural laws, material properties and internally stored energy,
this result in elimination of failures caused by human action or power failures. How-
ever, passive safety devices remain subject to failures due to mechanical or structural
defects and they are not synonymous to absolute reliability.
There are four categories in total of passive systems and they are characterized as
follows [1]:
• Category A
– No signal inputs, external power sources or forces.
– No moving mechanical parts.
– No moving working fluids
For example physical barriers against the release of fission products.




– No signal inputs, external power sources or forces.
– No moving mechanical parts.
– Moving working fluids, which are due to thermal-hydraulic (T-H) conditions
occurring when the safety function is activated.
For example emergency cooling systems based on air or water natural circulation in
heat exchangers (HEX) immersed in water pools.
• Category C
– No signal inputs, external power sources or forces.
– Moving mechanical parts, whether or not moving working fluids are also
present.
– Mechanical movements are because of e.g. static pressure in valves.
For example checks valves and spring-loaded relief valves.
• Category D
– Intermediary zone between active and passive. Execution of the safety
function is made through passive methods.
– External signal is permitted to trigger the passive process.
– Passive execution/active initiation.
– Energy only from stored sources.
– Active components limited to controls, instruments and valves.
For example emergency core cooling systems based on gravity-driven flowofwater,
activated by valves which break open on demand.
Recently, passive safety systems are widely used due to their advantages in the
innovative design of NPP in combination with active safety systems. Reliability of the
passive system is higher than an active system because the risk associated with active
(human error, power outage, etc.) can be neglected. However, the failure of passive
systems may be mainly due to some physical phenomena or natural forces. Which
need to be evaluated.
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4. Reliability of passive safety system and methodology
The reliability of passive system can be defined as the ability to perform the requested
safety function under dominates conditions when required and addressed mainly the
related performance stability.
For calculating the reliability of a passive system and component, you need to
remember that the failure rate depends on the mode of operation of this component,
as well as operating conditions such as design factor, complexity andmechanical stress
(vibration, shock loads, linear overloads), relative humidity, atmospheric pressure,
sudden temperature changes etc. Thus, the failure rate of this type of component in
real operation conditions is calculated by the formula:
𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖0 ∗ 𝐾𝐻 ∗ 𝐾Э ∗ 𝐾𝑡…
𝜆𝑖0 – is the failure rate of an element operating under normal conditions at a rated
electrical load,
K – is correction factors, depending on various factors [4].
5. The relationships between the reliability and stresses
The relationship between system reliability and stresses mainly depends on the infor-
mation obtained from operating experience that make us to understand the depen-
dencies.
In the general form, the dependence of the failure rate of components from the
environment has the form:
𝜆 = 𝑓(𝑡0, ℎ, 𝑥𝑔, 𝑃𝑝, …), (1)
Where t0,h-temperature and humidity environment; x𝑔 is the acceleration of the
mechanical loads acting on the product; P𝑝-pressure load.
If the actions of these factors put independent, the failure rate of components in the
operating mode is determined by the formula
𝜆𝑝=𝜆0∗𝑘1∗𝑘2…𝑘𝑛, (2)
𝑘1, 𝑘2,… , 𝑘𝑛—Coefficients characterizing the influence of certain types of impacts on
the failure rate.
To assess the effect of operating conditions on the failure rate of components,
we can limit ourselves to the consideration of the following factors: the effect of
surrounding temperature 𝑘1, pressure load 𝑘2, mechanical loads 𝑘3.
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Let’s consider a technique of definition of dependences (1) and (2) on experimental
data. The analysis shows that, various empirical formulas can be adopted as such
dependences, including polynomials of the n𝑡ℎ power. In this case, the solution of the
problemwill consist in determining the constant coefficients of the desired dependen-
cies, for which the ”stretched thread” method, the ”mean” method, the least squares
method, and the maximum likelihood method can be used.
6. Mathematical methods for reliability assessment of
passive system and component
6.1. The stretched thread method
This method is based on the geometric selection of the linear dependence 𝜆 = 𝑓(𝑡0)
on the eye. Taking two arbitrary points on the chosen line, find their coordinates
(𝑥1, 𝑦1), (𝑥2, 𝑦2) and make up a system of equations:
{
𝑎 ∗ 𝑥1 + 𝑏 = 𝑦1
𝑎 ∗ 𝑥2 + 𝑏 = 𝑦2
solving it, find the coefficients а и b.
6.2. The mean method
This method is based on balancing experimental errors of the form Δ𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎 ∗ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑏
for Π observations (𝑖 = 1, 2, ..., Π). All n observations are divided approximately in half













(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎 ∗ 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑏) = 0,
Solving this, find the coefficients a and b.
6.3. The maximum likelihood method
Let’s assume that a priori we can accept the following relationship between the failure
rate and the factors that affect it:
Λ(𝑥, 𝜗1, 𝜗2) = 𝜗1 exp{𝜗2𝑥}
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where x—is the magnitude of the external impact; 𝜗1, 𝜗2—are the parameters to be
determined from the operation data.
Suppose that when operating system from N components of one type, acting in
r devices in the modes 𝑥1, 𝑥2,… , 𝑥𝑟, received respectively 𝑛1, 𝑛2,… , 𝑛𝑟 failures. If the
working conditions of the products in the circuits are independent, then the probability
of obtaining a sample from 𝑛1, 𝑛2,… , 𝑛𝑟 of failures will be equal to






[Δ𝜏𝑖𝜗1 exp {𝜗2𝑥𝑖}]𝑛𝑖 − exp [−Δ𝜏𝑖𝜗𝑖 exp {𝜗2𝑥𝑖}] ,
Where Δ𝜏𝑖—duration of tests under external influences 𝑥𝑖.
Using the maximum likelihood method, equating partial derivatives with 𝜗1 and 𝜗2
from the logarithm of the reduced equation P(𝑛1, 𝑛2,… , 𝑛𝑟), we find the parameters


















Passive safety systems are believed to bemore reliable than the active safety systems
because of elimination of the need for human intervention, avoidance of external
electric supply.
Evaluation of passive system reliability is a challenging task. It involves a clear
understanding of the physics of the phenomena and failure mechanism of the system,
which the designer must do before prediction of its reliability.
More research is needed to determine the applicability of the proposed method to
evaluate the reliability of passive systems.
Logical continuation of the work will be carrying out experimental research work,
which includes conducting field experiments with electrical products that are part of
safety systems of nuclear power plants.
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